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BARACK OBAMA'S WAR ON TERROR 
POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE 
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11. Jack Goldsmith. 1 New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co. 2012. Pp. xvi + 311. $26.95 (Cloth). 
William E. Scheuerman2 
President Barack Obama's updated version of the so-called 
war on terror has received something of a "free pass" from most 
political and legal scholars.3 To be sure, civil libertarians at the 
ACLU, Center for Constitutional Rights, and other activist 
organizations,4 as well as liberal voices on the editorial pages of 
the New York Times,5 have pilloried Obama for his failure to 
fulfill what appeared to be a heartfelt 2008 campaign promise to 
dramatically reverse his conservative predecessor's controversial 
counterterrorism policies. Yet nothing akin to the avalanche of 
critical books or journal articles burying President George W. 
Bush's policies has emerged thus far. In part, the difference 
stems from Obama's admirable decision to abandon the Bush 
Administration's embrace of so-called "enhanced interrogation" 
(i.e., torture ).6 The silence likely stems as well from the partisan 
preferences of law professors and political scientists, many of 
whom instinctively sympathize with Obama and his Democratic 
Administration. Those defensive instincts have surely been 
reinforced, albeit inadvertently, by right-wing critics like Dick 
Cheney and Rudy Giuliani, neither of whom seems willing to 
miss an opportunity to appear before the TV cameras in order to 
denounce Obama for being "weak on terrorism."7 
1. Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
2. Professor of Political Science, Indiana University (Bloomington). 
3. I thank my colleague Sumit Ganguly for the (hopefully) felicitous phrasing 
here. 
4. See, e.g., Rights Groups File Challenge to Killings of Three Americans in U.S. 
Drone Strikes, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http;//ccrjusice.org/newsroom/ 
press-releases/rights-groups-file-challenge-killings-of-three-Americans-U.S. -drone-strikes 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
5. See, e.g., No Penalty for Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 4, 2012, at A26. 
6. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
7. See, e.g., Kevin Robillard, Cheney: Obama is Worse than Carter, POLITICO (July 
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So it probably should come as no surprise that the best 
available account of the Obama Administration's version of the 
war on terror comes from one of our leading conservative jurists, 
Jack Goldsmith, in his new and provocative volume. More 
unexpected is that if Goldsmith's description of Obama's policies 
and his Administration's legal justifications is to be believed, 
some of the President's vocal critics on Fox News can probably 
calm down: as Goldsmith for the most part convincingly outlines, 
continuities outnumber discontinuities as far as Obama's 
relationship to his Republican forerunner goes (pp. 3-48). Most 
surprising perhaps, Goldsmith seems at least broadly 
appreciative of- if not always enthusiastic about- the basic 
outlines of Obama's present political and legal brew, seeing in it 
the product of fruitful institutional learning that has 
characterized lJ.S. policy since 9/11 (p. xii). For those vexed 
about indefinite detention, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay, 
Goldsmith offers some reassuring words. Despite some blem-
ishes, the U.S. polity, blessed with a thriving civil society and 
firmly institutionalized checks and balances operating effectively 
to counter extreme policies, has in fact performled reasonably 
well since 9/11: President Bush was eventually forced to 
reconsider counterproductive and legally dubious policies (e.g., 
torture) (p. xii). Because of our resilient and indeed self-
correcting constitutional system, fruitful pushback not only 
encouraged officials to abandon such policies, but along the way 
vital lessons have been learned about how best to navigate what 
Goldsmith sees as a more-or-less permanent state of emergency 
(pp. xiv-xvi). Although Obama's present-day policies are by no 
means flawless, he has not only built on the lasting achievements 
of the Bush Administration's version of the war on terror, but 
has also sensibly tried to render them consonant with 
longstanding U .S.-backed legal ideals (pp. 5-20). Best of all, 
Obama has been driven to do so partly because he faces 
pressures like those which similarly forced President Bush to 
give ground (p. 24). Pace scholars on both the left and right who 
depict the present-day presidency as effectively uncontrolled by 
institutional and constitutional means, Goldsmith underscores 
crucial ways in which it continues to confront oftentimes 
imposing constraints.x 
30, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/79112.html. 
i-1. BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
(2010): MATTHEW CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: 
UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED (2007); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE 
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Providing a hardheaded yet surprisingly sympathetic look at 
President Obama's policies, Goldsmith's volume provides 
illuminating reading for anyone interested in the political and 
legal vagaries of post 9/11 U.S. counterterrorism. Unfortunately, 
the author's insufficiently critical view of the U.S. constitutional 
system leads him not only to exaggerate its successes in dealing 
with terrorism, but also to distort some of the complexities of 
counterterrorism under the Obama Administration. 
I. IN GEORGE W. BUSH'S FOOTSTEPS 
Many readers of this journal are already familiar with the 
fact that Goldsmith served as Assistant Attorney General in the 
Office of Legal Counsel between October 2003 and June 2004, 
before running afoul of precisely those Bush Administration 
officials who supported far more outlandish views about 
executive prerogative.9 So his present volume represents an 
implicit attempt to provide an ex post facto justification for the 
more moderate course he advocated under President Bush, as 
well as a clear suggestion that voices like his won the war even if 
they lost the internecine bureaucratic battles: counterterrorism 
law and policy not only positively evolved in the direction sought 
by moderate conservatives like Goldsmith who were abrasively 
pushed aside by their rivals, but President Obama has relied 
heavily on the Bush Administration's approach between 2006 
and January 2009: "The bottom line is that it copied most of the 
Bush counterterrorism program as it stood in January 2009, 
expanded some of it, and narrowed a bit" (p. 5). 
To be sure, Goldsmith concedes that Obama has broken 
decisively with his precursor's positions in some crucial arenas. 
Most dramatically, Obama has disavowed the Bush 
Administration's early endorsement of torture (p. 14), and 
despite sizeable political opposition also released significant 
quantities of previously classified documents about recent U.S. 
interrogation practices, some of which provide absolutely 
harrowing details. 10 Obama also cut loose from Bush by closing 
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010): FREDERICK A.O. 
SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007); PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: HOW 
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009). 
9. For his own perspective on his battles within the Bush Administration, see 
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007). 
10. Al-Qaeda militants Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed "were 
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down so-called offshore "black sites" where suspected terrorists 
were subjected to controversial forms of interrogation and 
detainment, while forthrightly reaffirming the U.S. commitment 
to the relevant Geneva conventions concerning the humane 
treatment of prisoners (p. 16). He also has moved away from 
making constitutionally tendentious claims concerning inherent 
executive power, instead tending to appeal to statutory 
legislation (e.g., Congress's September 18, 2001 authorization 
"to use all necessary and appropriate forces" against those 
aiding or abetting the 9/11 attacks) as a legal justification for his 
actions (pp. 39-41). As part of a noteworthy shift in the 
rhetorical (and sometimes legal) framework under which 
counterterrorism is now waged, the bellicose language of "war 
on terror" has pretty much vanished from A.dministration 
statements, the dubious legal category of "enemy combatant" is 
no longer deployed, and, most importantly, even when pursuing 
actions seemingly reminiscent of his predecessor's, the Obama 
Administration generally highlights their alleged compatibility 
with basic rule of law virtues (e.g., the right to a fair hearing) 
(pp. 40-41). Even though Goldsmith sometirnes wants to 
downplay the degree to which this move represents significantly 
more than improved political "packaging" ,11 he concedes that 
Obama's rule of law rhetoric has not only generated political 
capital for the president, but has also shaped some key facets of 
U.S. counterterrorism (pp. 39-48). 
Admitting that such changes remain considerable, 
Goldsmith nonetheless proceeds to make a strong case in 
defense of his thesis that "Obama [has] continued almost all of 
his predecessor's counterterrorism policies" (p. x). In this vein, 
Obama has publicly renewed President Bush's declaration of a 
"national emergency" from September 14, 2001, and elsewhere 
has frequently taken over-or at most modestly altered-core 
Bush-era legal arguments and doctrines. Although its public 
rhetoric might suggest otherwise, the Administration continues 
to insist that the U.S. remains at war with Al-Qaeda, and it still 
asserts far-reaching executive authority to combat terrorism by 
appealing to the vast and arguably unwieldy delegations of 
waterboarded hundreds of times. Others were subjected to eleven straight days of sleep 
deprivation." DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE 
SOUL OF THE 0BAMA PRESIDENCY 73-74 (2012). 
11. For an alternative view that takes Obama's rule of law "packaging" somewhat 
more seriously, see David Cole, Obama and Terror: The Hovering Questions, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS (July 12, 2012) http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/jul/12/obama-and-
terror-hovering-questions/. 
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authority promulgated right after the 9/11 attacks (e.g.~ the 
congressional declaration of war against Al-Qaeda) (pp. 5-6). 
Like his conservative predecessor, Obama relies on the 
controversial Patriot Act-whose renewal he supported- to 
legitimize some of his policies (p. 16). Nor has the Obama 
Administration bothered to explain when~ if ever, the ongoing 
war on terror and/or "state of emergency" will conclude (p. 21-
22). Not surprisingly, the Administration has continued many 
and perhaps most of the extensive forms of intelligence 
gathering and surveillance employed by Bush (pp. 16-17). As 
Goldsmith points out, Obama has even tellingly "approved the 
construction of a $1.5 billion, one-million-square-foot NSA data 
center" in Utah equipped with state-of-the art cybersecurity 
tools (p. 17). 
Despite Obama's initial promise to close it down, 
Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) remains open and operative, albeit 
on a smaller scale (i.e., with only 167 detainees12) than under 
Bush (pp. 11-12). Even if blame for this failure can by no means 
be placed solely or perhaps even chiefly at Obama's feet, he has 
followed Bush in endorsing indefinite detention for some 
suspected terrorists, many of whom will apparently remain in 
more-or-less permanent limbo at GTMO (pp. 12-13). Similarly, 
the Obama Administration reformed, but by no means 
abandoned, the system of military commissions inherited from 
the Bush Administration (p. 9). While the commissions now look 
quite different from the kangaroo courts initially sought by 
former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and others, in part 
because of some real procedural improvements (p. 187), the 
overall picture remains sobering: the Administration is still 
fighting off legal challenges to its attempt to give base 
commanders carte blanche authority over visits by legal counsel, 
along with discretion to decide how lawyers can use classified 
information they may glean from detainees they represent. 13 
Again reminiscent of its forerunner, the Obama 
Administration continues to practice rendition, and though most 
evidence suggests that it has done so more humanely, the legal 
test it employs for determining where to send accused terrorists 
remains unchanged: only if there is more than a 50°/o chance of 
12. U.S. Names 55 Set .for Tran\ferfrom Guantanamo. N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 21,2012, at 
A6. 
13. See e.g., Jane Sutton, U.S. Judge Blocks New Restrictions on Guantanamo 
Lawyers, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/06/us-usa-
guan tanamo-idUSB RE8851 E 720120906. 
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detainees facing torture in a particular country are officials 
prohibited from sending them there (p. 15). Similarly, even 
though it has improved screening and procedural protections for 
detainees, the Administration also argues that basic habeas 
corpus protections do not cover those captured overseas (e.g., in 
Afghanistan) (p. 13). It seems as well to have appropriated the 
Bush Administration's hard line views on state secrecy, fighting 
no less aggressively in using it to dismiss lawsuits challenging its 
policies (e.g., in recent legal challenges to "targeted killings" of 
suspected terrorists) (pp. 13-14, 17-19). Like the Bush 
Administration, Obama 's Administration insists on its right to 
engage in forum shopping: only when it is legally and politically 
convenient will suspected foreign-born terrorists get their day in 
civilian court (pp. 10-11). Moreover, as the New York Times 
editors recently commented, "[a ]ny remaining hope for imposing 
meaningful accountability for torture and other abuses 
committed" under the Bush Administration has "for all practical 
purposes" now ended. 14 Even those CIA interrogators who likely 
tortured prisoners to death, going well beyond even those 
suspect interrogation practices condoned by President Bush, will 
not be facing prosecution under Attorney General Eric Holder. 15 
Last but by no means least, the Obama Administration has 
gone beyond anything President Bush attempted in one major 
area: he has dramatically ramped up the targeted killing of 
suspected terrorists abroad, even claiming legal authority to 
kill-and then proceeding to do so-a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-
Aulaqi, and then turning to Bush-era legal doctrines to beat 
back a courtroom challenge from the ACLU (pp. 13-14, 18-19). 
As Newsweek journalist Daniel Klaidman shows in his aptly 
entitled Kill or Capture: The War on Terror and the Soul of the 
Obama Pre,\'idency, an insightful account of the Administration's 
internal battles about counterterrorism, targeted killings, 
preferably by means of drones, quickly became the 
Administration's favored device for combating terrorism for a 
mix of interlocking political and legal imperatives. 16 They allow 
the Administration to minimize unnecessary U.S. military 
casualties in a seemingly endless war on terror, while typically 
garnering strong public support and permitting Obama to 
accentuate his image as a strong leader tough on national 
14. No Penalty for Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,2012, at A22. 
15. /d. 
16. See KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 117-43. 
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security issues. 17 Just as conveniently, they do not require 
capturing and detaining dangerous terrorists, which has become 
a political and legal morass given congressional hostility to trying 
foreign terrorists in ordinary courts as well as the 
Administration's own commitment to downsize Gitmo and other 
offshore detention centers.'H Despite widespread condemnation 
from abroad, the Administration continues to favor targeted 
killings as its weapon of choice in the war on terror. In fact, they 
have even garnered the unlikely imprimatur of one of the 
Administration's most prominent liberal jurists, State 
Department Legal Advisor and Yale Law School professor 
Harold Koh, who interprets them- when targets are properly 
selected- as legitimized by the U.S. declaration of war against 
Al-Qaeda.' 9 Nonetheless, they remain controversial for one 
straightforward reason: President Obama has taken it upon 
himself to serve as judge, jury, and executioner even in cases 
involving U.S. citizens. 
Civil libertarians may be exaggerating somewhat when they 
dub Obama's war on terror "Bush Lite." Nonetheless, a 
powerful case can be made that Obama has in fact mostly 
followed in his predecessor's footsteps, and that at least in one 
arena (i.e., targeted killings) he has in fact radicalized 
employment of one suspect, controversial Bush-era 
antiterrorism tool. 
II. BARACK OBAMA AS ENIGMA 
Such continuities leave us with an obvious enigma. As 
Goldsmith recounts, in 2008, Obama campaigned aggressively 
against the Bush Administration's counterterrorism program 
and its embrace of torture (p. 4). Of course, presidents often fail 
to fulfill promises made on the campaign trail. Yet Obama's 
commitment to a fundamental overhaul seemed to represent 
something more than the usual political tool employed to win 
over some segment of the electorate. A longstanding and 
eloquent defender of the rule of law, former editor of the 
Harvard Law Review, protege of some of our most prominent 
liberal jurists (e.g., Laurence Tribe), and former law professor at 
17. /d.atll9-22. 
18. In Pakistan, he tween 2004 and 2007, there were nine drone attacks authorized 
by the Bush Administration; in 2010 Obama authorized 111. KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, 
at 117. 
19. /d. at 215-20 (discussing Koh's evolving views on targeted killing). 
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the University of Chicago, Obama seemed genuinely committed 
to dramatic policy and legal changes. Based on his own 
legislative record, as well as his soaring rhetoric, and last but not 
least the fact that popular anxiety about terrorism was no longer 
dominating the U.S. political landscape by 2008 and 2009, many 
observers quite sensibly expected that we would see major 
changes in counterterrorism. Adding to the enigmta's complexity 
is a large body of recent evidence corroborating the deeply 
rooted nature of Obama's constitutionalist and legalist instincts; 
Klaidman's Kill or Capture describes numerous episodes in the 
last four years when the President at least initially joined forces 
with so-called "idealistic" defenders of the rule of law (in 
particular, Attorney General Holder) in opposition to political 
operatives (e.g., Rahm Emmanuel) whose primary job was to 
guarantee their boss's political success rather than restore the 
rule of law.20 At least on some occasions (for example, when 
supporting the release of secret documents about U.S. 
interrogation practices), he did so at considerable political risk. 
So why has Obama failed to transform U.S. counter-
terrorism policy? The most obvious answer is one Goldsmith 
fails to examine at length, even though it has garnered a sizeable 
following among Obama's disappointed liberal supporters as 
well as some journalists like Klaidman. It zeroes in on Obama's 
failings as a political leader: his Administration has simply 
messed things up, with an indecisive chief executive too often 
ineptly overseeing an array of top-level officials and advisors 
deeply divided over how and when to overturn Bush-era policies 
on terrorism. President Obama has failed decisively to set the 
agenda, either vis-a-vis his own cabinet, or in relation to the 
public at large. As David Cole has recently pointed out in this 
vein, President Obama has given up even trying to employ the 
presidential bully pulpit, here as in other policy arenas too often 
letting demagogical critics define the terms of the debate.21 
Predictably perhaps, he has ended up deferring at crucial 
junctures to the "old hands" in the federal security and 
intelligence apparatus. As Goldsmith accurately chronicles, 
many of Obama's top advisors on terrorism have in fact been 
rather conservative political figures, a number of whom worked 
for President Bush (Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for 
example) (p. 27). His point man on counterterrorism, CIA 
20. See, q;., KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 61-63 (discussing the decision to release 
the torture memos). 
21. See Cole, supra note II. 
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Director John Brennan, previously spent twenty-five years in 
intelligence and served as George Tenet's Chief of Staff while 
the Bush Administration pursued its new interrogation program 
(pp. 28). Not surprisingly, when push came to shove, Obama 
opted to pursue a cautious path, following the advice of those 
deeply enmeshed in the apparatus of the national security state 
while regularly ignoring dissenting voices from the human rights 
community and his own home base, the liberal legal academy. 
Even if this explanation carries some weight, it suffers from 
one glaring weakness: as Klaidman's own useful play-by-play 
political account nicely lays out, when in 2009 Obama did 
arguably try to lead the way in pursuing an alternative policy 
course, in part by means of a series of forceful public 
pronouncements about the need to redesign counterterrorism 
more in sync with U.S. legal ideals, his efforts ignited destructive 
political fires within his "own" Democratic Congress and outside 
of it as well. Most obviously, his modest but eloquently 
articulated efforts to close down GTMO and try Al-Qaeda 
leaders like Khalid Sheik Mohammed in federal court were 
aggressively rebuffed by Congress, which quickly and 
overwhelmingly moved to prohibit him from transferring 
detainees to prisons within the U.S.22 (The vote in the 
Democratic controlled Senate was 90-6 against Obama, with 
only six Democrats supporting his efforts; the House vote in 
favor of the revealingly entitled "Keep the Terrorists Out of 
America Act" drew similarly massive bipartisan support.23) 
Revealingly, Klaidman chronicles that with Obama's stamp of 
approval, Attorney General Holder released classified materials 
about Bush-era torture practices in part probably hoping for a 
public outcry which might then open the door to a congressional 
investigation and perhaps criminal prosecution.24 Holder in fact 
got his outcry; however, it took a different tone than he 
apparently expected: the conservative right-in alliance with Fox 
News and other major media outlets-provided the Attorney 
General with his first (of many) political shellackings.2~ Obama 
and Holder soon found themselves running for political cover, 
mercilessly abandoned even by Senator Harry Reid and other 
22. See KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 105-72. 
23. /d. at 89, 156. 
24. /d. at 73. 
25. Trish Ponder, Republicans Holding Obama Nominees Hostage to Block Release 
of Bush Torture Memos, PENSITO REV. (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.pensitoreview. 
com/2009/04/10/republicans-holding-obama-nominees-hostage-to-block-release-of-bush-
torture-memos/. 
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prominent members of the president's own party when word 
leaked about the plan to relocate Uighur GTMO detainees.26 
So it is perhaps wishful thinking to believe that if Obama 
had been more effective at using his political capital he might 
also have been much more successful in changing Bush-era 
policies. Even if political errors were undeniably made, this 
explanation underplays the key role of what now appears to be 
deeply rooted opposition within both Congress and what now 
passes in the U.S. for civil society to a genuine liberalization of 
U.S. counterterrorism. Needless to say, this political climate 
raises many fundamental questions about contemporary U.S. 
democracy and the apparent willingness of so rrtany of its key 
players to sacrifice basic legal protections and rule of law 
guarantees in the face of terrorist threats, real or otherwise. 
These unsettling trends perhaps stem in part from the modern 
presidential executives oftentimes neglected links to traditional 
monarchy, whose main function as "protector of the realm" had 
far-reaching institutional as well as symbolic implications.27 Not 
surprisingly perhaps, contemporary proponents of an outsized 
executive increasingly seem willing to embrace and even 
celebrate the U.S. presidency's monarchical origins.2K 
In any event, Obama perhaps should have done n1ore to 
change the political climate. However, one can also easily 
understand why competing political pressures (e.g., his 
commitment to getting health care reform through Congress) 
soon encouraged him to place the battle for a revised 
counterterrorism program on the back burner: the opposition to 
real change seemed so deep, and the political costs of 
challenging it correspondingly exorbitant. 
Goldsmith pays more attention to another explanation we 
might characterize as the "institutional realist'' position. 
According to this view, governing is different fron1 campaigning. 
Now sitting in the Oval Office, and forced to read daily briefings 
about ongoing terrorist plots against U.S. citizens, the world 
inevitably looks very different to Obama than it did from the 
U.S. Senate or on the campaign trail in Iowa or Oregon (p. 25). 
"[T]he grim reality of presidential responsibility" inexorably 
26. KLAIDMAN. supra note I 0, at 109. 
27. For a critical take on the monarchist attributes of the U.S. presidency, see 
William E. Scheuerman, American Kingship?: Monarchical Origins of Modern 
Presidentialism, 37 POLITY 24-53 (2005). 
28. JOHN YOO. THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005). 
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transformed Obama (p. 26). Obama inherited a vast array of 
institutions, practices, and norms, many of which are relatively 
impermeable to dramatic alteration for reasons known to 
anyone familiar with the workings of complex bureaucracies. In 
this vein, GTMO was only the most egregious constitutional and 
political mess dropped at Obama's front door at his new home in 
the White House (p. 27). Not surprisingly, the choreography of 
closing down GTMO rapidly turned out to be more complex 
than Obama anticipated, in part because of its estimated forty-
four hardcore detainees, many of whose rights had been violated 
by "enhanced interrogation," leaving Obama with the un-
enviable and perhaps impossible task of closing down GTMO 
without simultaneously releasing genuine security threats who 
could no longer be successfully prosecuted in ordinary courts 
because of tainted and probably inadmissible evidence.29 From 
Obama's perspective, the choice must have appeared tragic: he 
could let Al-Qaeda sympathizers-and likely some of its most 
heinous masterminds-go free and thereby uphold the rule of 
law, but only at the cost of a potential security disaster and 
massive political backlash. 
Even if this narrative provides part of the solution to the 
enigma, it still misses something fundamental. For example, it 
probably fails to account for the surprisingly across-the-board 
contours of the continuities between Bush and Obama. While 
one can easily grasp why the mess at GTMO proved so 
burdensome, it remains more difficult to understand why 
internal institutional imperatives necessarily forced Obama to 
continue his predecessor's surveillance policies, or why they 
preclude prosecution of egregious human rights violations. Nor 
can they easily explain Obama's apparent enthusiasm for 
targeted killings. With every new resident in the White House 
there is always an unavoidable element of bureaucratic 
continuity. But why do we now observe so much of it precisely 
where we might have predicted far-reaching reform? 
To his credit, Goldsmith undertakes to provide an 
alternative explanation; most of his volume is devoted to 
providing a detailed defense of it. While the ACLU and other 
civil libertarian groups are deeply worried about Obama's 
borrowings from Bush, he sees them as basically praiseworthy. 
In this account, a beneficial process of institutional learning has 
transpired since 9/11, with U.S. officials coming to grasp that 
29. KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 147. 
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excessive assertions of executive prerogative, go-it-alone 
unilateralism, and kneejerk anti-legalism are ineffective and 
counterproductive in fighting terrorism (p. 38). According to 
Goldsmith, by the final years of the Bush Administration, many 
of the most important lessons had already been learned; 
Obama's main policy-level contribution has been to fine-tune 
Bush era policies and legal doctrines that were pretty much in 
place by 2006 (pp. 38-39). What we now have is something 
approaching a rough consensus concerning the broad outlines, 
though not always the particulars (about which partisans will 
legitimately continue to differ), concerning the appropriate 
policy and legal bases of the war on terror. To be sure, the 
learning process has been difficult and sometimes painful: 
Congress, the courts, as well as civil society organizations like 
the ACLU, whose positions Goldsmith otherwise criticizes, had 
to fight back hard against President Bush (pp. 95-118). The same 
institutional and civil society-based pressures, Goldsmith tells us, 
have restrained President Obama: "Obama too felt the sting of 
checks and balances when he tried and failed to close the 
Guantanamo Bay detention facility and to prosecute 9/11 
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in civilian court" (p. 
xiii). Nonetheless, the good news consists not only of our now 
much improved counterterrorism programs, but also the fact 
that checks and balances have worked along the lines pretty 
much sought by James Madison and other Framers, even if they 
have sometimes operated in a manner which might have 
surprised them (p. xiii). 
For Goldsmith, a "traditional focus on the President, 
Congress, and the Supreme Court" needs to be supplemented by 
a careful examination of "surprising lower-level forces, inside 
and outside the government, that have been so consequential in 
shaping presidential action" (pp. xiv-xv). Forces :in civil society, 
in conjunction with institutional innovations potentially over-
looked by a conventional view of the separation of powers, have 
revitalized the U.S. version of checks and balances in accordance 
with contemporary needs. Even if one might second guess 
elements of President Obama's version of the war on terror, 
Goldsmith argues, because of our political systen1's resilience it 
has done a quite respectable job at grappling with terrorism (pp. 
xv-xvi). 
In an era of permanent emergency, none of us can perhaps 
sleep soundly anymore. Yet those vexed about Obama's policy 
debts to Bush, as well as the alleged but unproven institutional 
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weaknesses of the U.S. version of liberal democracy, can now 
put at least some of their anxieties to rest. 
III. NOT YOUR MOTHER'S CHECKS AND BALANCES 
Goldsmith outlines the successes of our updated system of 
"distributed checks and balances" in his volume's central 
chapters (pp. 51-204). Unfortunately, he overstates them. 
For example, he begins by describing a thriving culture of 
"accountability journalism," to which he ascribes "hundreds of 
astounding journalistic successes since 9/11 in disclosing deep 
governmental secrets" (p. 56). Equipped with the new 
technologies of the digital age, journalists and activists have been 
able to exploit the Achilles heel of a sprawling intelligence and 
security apparatus, allegedly characterized by a "[w]idespread 
disrespect of the secrecy system," to unmask the details of even 
some highly classified materials (p. 71). Although he worries that 
the trend towards transparency risks going too far, he tends to 
praise the efforts of oftentimes solitary journalists, bloggers, and 
others in spreading the word about some of the more extreme 
measures pursued by the Bush Administration, and he views 
their efforts as crucial for understanding why the war on terror 
no longer rests on shaky legal and humanitarian foundations (pp. 
79-82). Providing a fresh reminder of their sometimes heroic 
role in opposing both an Administration hostile to its efforts, as 
well as public opinion supportive of an aggressive military 
response to Al-Qaeda, Goldsmith reminds us of the decisive role 
played by Mark Danner, Seymour Hersh, Jane Mayer, and many 
others in generating public criticism of indefinite detention, 
torture, and other controversial counterterrorist instruments (pp. 
65-67).30 
Unfortunately, the argument suffers from two flaws. First, 
some of the alleged successes stories he recounts easily lend 
themselves to a less optimistic gloss. As Goldsmith notes, as 
early as October 2001 foreign journalists were reporting about 
secret offshore U.S. prisons and controversial interrogation 
practices (pp. 63, 65). Yet the story made little headway in the 
U.S. until 2004 or so, when The New Yorker and other 
30. See also MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, 
AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); SEYMOUR HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE 
ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU GHRAIB (2004); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 
(2008). 
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publications began devoting significant attention to it (p. 66). As 
Goldsmith admits, it was not until September 2006 that the Bush 
Administration in fact acknowledged the existence of the secret 
prisons and starting to clear them out (p. 67). }\. success story 
perhaps, yet nonetheless one in which the Bush Administration 
was able to pursue harsh interrogation measures with little 
public scrutiny for a number of years, and in fact continued 
doing so undeterred for nearly five years. 
More fundamentally, here as elsewhere in his volume, 
Goldsmith sometimes has a hard time showing exactly how 
diffuse political pressures from civil society get effectively 
funneled and employed by Congress and the Supreme Court in 
order to rein in the presidency. He sometimes sirnply asserts the 
existence of a connection between the two. A related tendency 
to clump together-both analytically and erntpirically-civil 
society with institutional checks and balances engenders another 
problem: it becomes impossible to figure out exactly which 
factors in his narrative are doing the real work of checking the 
executive. Is it the free press and/or certain advocacy groups, the 
traditional separation of powers and checks and balances, new 
institutional devices which perhaps challenge our conventional 
tripartite vision of government, or some combination thereof? 
At least in principle, for example, political pressures from civil 
society might restrain government officials even absent a 
Madisonian version of institutionalized checks and balances.31 
When Goldsmith addresses the role of institutional checks, 
rather than that played by journalists and activists in civil 
society, he similarly exaggerates their successes in restraining the 
executive. During much of the Brush presidency, Congress 
remained at most a junior partner in the war on terror, regularly 
bending over backwards to grant the executive discretionary 
power to wage the war against Al-Qaeda as the executive alone 
saw fit. To be sure, there were some exceptions~ most notably 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which took aim at the Bush 
Administration's excesses (pp. 185-86). But even Goldsmith 
inadvertently concedes that many of Congress' at first glance far-
reaching attempts to regulate the Administration's treatment of 
detainees proved modest at best. For example, while struggling 
to defend his idiosyncratic view of the Military Cornmissions Act 
of 2006 "as a defeat for the presidency and a victory for 
31. See POSNER & VERMEliLE, supra note 8, at 4 (arguing that political but not 
Madisonian legal or constitutional restraints now check the executive). 
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Congress," he still admits that it "'reaffirmed Congress's reversal 
of the Supreme Court's Rasul decision and once again 
eliminated statutory habeas corpus review for GTMO 
detaineesL]" while giving "the President many things he 
wanted" (p. 187). If this represents defeat for the presidency, 
what constitutes victory? 
As noted above, Congress has in fact pushed back forcibly 
against President Obama. However, its main efforts have 
consisted of resisting his cautious quest to place the war on 
terror on firmer legal footing by closing GTMO for example, or 
placing accused terrorists under the auspices of the ordinary 
courts. Especially since falling under Republican control in 2010, 
Congress has typically tried to advance and sometimes codify 
even more punitive and repressive policies than those sought by 
Obama. Most recently, the 2012 defense appropriations bill 
codifies indefinite military detention and effectively prohibits 
the President from trying to bring accused terrorists before 
ordinary courts.32 Because of political pressure, Obama 
ultimately decided to sign it, before then proceeding to 
ameliorate some-but hardly all-of its draconian attributes.33 In 
short, Goldsmith's thesis that checks and balances have worked 
effectively to counter executive excesses in the war on terror 
only makes sense if you place recent attempts by President 
Obama to move beyond his predecessor's arguably extreme 
policies in the same category as President Bush's advocacy of 
them. Congress has in fact constrained the presidency, hut not in 
a manner which might have comforted James Madison: it has 
waged battle against Obama's uneven efforts to dismantle some 
features of the modern imperial presidency.34 
Too often, Goldsmith's assessment of our political system's 
alleged institutional successes depends on underlying political 
judgments, such as the tendentious view that President Obama's 
liberal "excesses" can be treated as functionally equivalent to 
the excesses of his predecessor. Unfortunately, this not only 
tends to distort key features of the story, but it also leads the 
32. DEP'T OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS BILL OF 2012, HR 1540, 112th Cong. 
(2012). 
33. See Talking Points: 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), ACLU, 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/talking-points-2012-national-defense-authorization-
act-ndaa (last visited Jan. 3, 2013) (describing the ACLU's opposition to many of 
thesordid provisions); see also KLAIDMAN, supra note 10, at 230-31. 
34. ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AFTER WATERGATE (2006) (updating the "imperial presidency" 
thesis of executive power). 
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author to find success where others rnight legitimately remain 
deeply concerned: the baseline for "success" in institutional 
terms unavoidably points to basic normative and political 
preferences, whose centrality to his broader account Goldsmith 
downplays. So he concludes by boldly declaring that "never 
before has the Commander in Chief been so influenced, and 
constrained, by law" (p. 208), triumphantly describing ours as a 
system in which the executive is now checked and rendered 
accountable in far-reaching and perhaps unprecedented ways. 
What then about the obvious counterargument that no high-
level official who condoned torture, or even low-level 
interrogators who practiced it, have yet to face prosecution? 
According to Goldsmith, we need not worry too much because 
"[t]he legality of the original CIA interrogation techniques 
under the purposefully loophole-ridden torture law was always a 
closer question than critics have publicly acknowledged," with 
"many outstanding lawyers" concluding that "if exercised with 
care" they "were lawful under then prevailing law" (p. 236). In 
other words, his own judgment that we should be less alarmed 
than many others have claimed (e.g., the ACLlJ) about what 
transpired in the aftermath of 9/11 functions as an implicit 
standard for praising our system of checks and balances. His 
claim is rendered all the more odd since the volume's main thesis 
is that productive institutional learning countered extreme and 
counterproductive policies pursued by Bush. But which policies 
does Goldsmith in fact have in mind if even the legality of 
torture represents a "closer question" than civil libertarians 
admit? 
Analogously, Goldsmith sees the Supreme Court rulings in 
Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan, and Boumediene as having 
regularly "had a constraining impact on the President, his senior 
national security advisers, and soldiers in the field" (p. 194). To 
his credit, Goldsmith here effectively links institutional checks 
on the executive to the civil society-based efforts of activists and 
lawyers, many of whom have now fought for more than a decade 
to guarantee that GTMO detainees and others enjoy basic rights 
(pp. 194-96). Although much undoubtedly can be said in favor 
of this view, Goldsmith only acknowledges- but never really 
takes seriously- the position held by many of the actual activists 
and lawyers about whom he reports, namely that their struggles 
have chiefly produced limited and sometimes superficial 
alterations to what remains a fundamentally immoral and 
unconstitutional system for regulating detainees. In the blunt 
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words of Michael Ratner at the Center for Constitutional Rights: 
"We lost on the preventive detention issue, more or less. We lost 
on the military commission issue, more or less" (p. 195). In short, 
Goldsmith fails to consider sufficiently the substantive possibility 
that the courts have done "too little, too late" in upholding basic 
rights, while simultaneously ignoring an emerging scholarly 
literature suggesting that the impact of even seemingly major 
Supreme Court decisions has been limited.35 Here again, 
Goldsmith's own politically conservative preferences directly 
shape his institutional analysis. In contrast, those readers of a 
libertarian or left-liberal bent, more disappointed by the 
judiciary's record since 9/11, might quite legitimately question 
his relatively optimistic gloss on the post 9/11 courts. 
For that matter, how secure will the institutional learning 
process described by Goldsmith prove, for example, if 
Republicans soon gain control of the presidency and Senate? 
During the 2011 and 2012 Republican presidential primary 
debates, the candidates at times struggled to outshine one 
another in endorsing waterboarding and other suspect 
interrogation techniques.36 
The book's most innovative section covers easily 
overlooked but key lower-level institutional mechanisms within 
our novel system of "distributed checks and balances." 
Goldsmith writes at length and oftentimes insightfully about 
what is now widely described as "lawfare," i.e., the tendency to 
embed lawyers directly in military and security affairs, including 
the nitty-gritty of the battlefield itself (pp. 223-33). Another 
illuminating section discusses the increasingly major role of 
Inspector Generals "sprinkled around the executive branch" and 
given mandates to prevent wrongdoing and serve as internal 
watchdogs (p. 99). Yet even if Goldsmith sometimes succeeds in 
showing how such creative institutional innovations help 
guarantee the executive's fidelity to the law, they remain 
fundamentally internal to the executive branch, and thus 
ultimately accountable- in both formal and countless informal 
ways- to the president. At the very least, they diverge at least 
35. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385 (2010) 
(discussing the limited impact of Boumediene). Revealingly, Klaidman's insider-focused 
account of Obama Administration battles on the war on terror barely mentions the 
judiciary; it does not seem to have figured much at all in their political calculations. See 
KLAIDMAN, supra note 10. 
36. Casey Glynn, Cain, Bachmann Say They Would Support Waterboarding, CBS 
NEWS (Nov. 13,2011, 12:01 AM), www,cbsnews.com/8301-503544-162-57323716-50354411 
cain-bachmann-say-they-would-support-waterboarding/. 
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somewhat from what Madison typically had in mind. To be sure, 
Madison was no defender of a pure separation of powers, but 
instead sought a system in which institutions were intermeshed 
and expected to cooperate.37 Yet checks and balances could only 
work if differentiated institutions possessed effective tools (e.g., 
the executive veto) with which they could counter rivals. 
Probably in part because of the unduly vague way in which 
Goldsmith conceptualizes checks and balances and their ties to 
civil society, his narrative generally occludes the degree to which 
new institutional mechanisms do not in reality represent a mere 
updated variant of "the framers' original design of making 
presidential action accountable" (p. 209). Regrettably, his failure 
to do so forecloses a serious consideration of the possibility that 
the U.S. constitutional system has developed useful new 
restraints on the executive only by means of devices incongruent 
with original Madison's vision. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Even though Goldsmith's book succeeds in documenting 
myriad ways in which President Bush has determined the 
outlines of his successor's modestly revised version of the war on 
terror, it suffers from two interconnected flaws. First, Goldsmith 
never fully puts to rest the legitimate concern that our system is 
now an imbalanced system of government, in which the 
executive remains best situated to exploit terrorist threats, real 
or otherwise, in order to expand its authority, and where neither 
civil society nor institutional checks and balances work 
sufficiently to restrain it. Tellingly, when Congress has recently 
pushed back forcefully against the executive, it oftentimes has 
done so in order to ward off cautious attempts to downsize the 
imperial presidency and the weighty powers it has accrued over 
the last decade. When checks and balances have come into play 
since 9/11, they sometimes did so not-as Madison and other 
classical writers hoped- in order to rein in executive excess, but 
rather in order to provide it with a stronger statutory footing. 
Second, Goldsmith ultimately offers a self-satisfied and 
occasionally even smug view of the U.S. political system's 
response to 9/ll, praising its ability to learn frorn its mistakes 
and correct them. Yet that assessment tends to depend on 
implicit political and normative preferences, many of which will 
37. But see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 8, at 19-25 (arguing that Madison also 
envisioned competition as a way for the branches to check and monitor each other). 
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strike at least some readers as controversial and even 
troublesome. For anyone more worried than Goldsmith 
apparently remains about indefinite detention, targeted killings, 
or the fact that presidential candidates from at least one of our 
major parties continue to endorse torture, the last decade hardly 
represents a bright spot in the long annals of U.S. constitutional 
government. 
So is our attempt to evaluate our political system's response 
to 9/11 nothing more than a reflection of underlying political and 
moral preferences? Of course not. If we are to solve the enigma 
of Obama 's war on terrorism, we will need a systematic 
comparative examination of how our presidential system has 
performed in the face of terror attacks when compared to other 
(e.g., parliamentary or semi-presidential) versions of liberal 
democracy, in which checks and balances operate quite 
differently.3x Goldsmith is right to seek a solution to the enigma 
by turning to an examination of U.S. constitutional mechanisms 
and the separation of powers. However, his efforts founder in 
part because they refuse to step outside the U.S. legal academy's 
usual comfort zone and engage works in political sociology and 
political science that raises broader questions of comparative 
institutional design. Even if such comparative institutional and 
legal inquiries still contain unavoidably normative moments, 
they can provide us with a sounder empirical baseline for what 
constitutes a "successful" response to terrorism.39 Like too many 
others in the legal academy, Goldsmith seems uninterested in 
making such comparisons, let alone in the possibility that we 
might have something vital to learn from other countries' 
political experiences with terrorism or emergency government. 
Yet without pursuing such comparisons in a systematic and 
rigorous manner, how can we be so sure that U.S. presidential 
democracy has done reasonably well in fighting terrorism, or 
even that it represents a sufficient institutionalization of modern 
liberal and democratic ideals? 
38. See William E. Scheuerman, Presidentialism and Emergency Government, in 
EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 258-86 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008) 
(describing the specific pathologies of presidentialism in the context of crisis or 
emergency government). 
39. THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE GROWTH OF EXECUTIVE POWER: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (John E. Owens & Riccardo Pelizzo, eds., 2010) (offering a 
preliminary contribution to a broader comparative analysis). 
